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CAPITAL GAINS FOR BUILDERS OF RESIDENTIAL
SUBDIVISIONS
By THEODoRE R. GROOM*
Ambitious and Backward are both builders of residen-
tial subdivisions. Their non-tax problems are characteristic
of the building industry. Financially, building is a risky
business. The items which must be purchased - land.
steel, general building materals - fluctuate greatly in
price. The supply, if not the price, of labor is uncertain,
and the quality undependable.' Most important, the pur-
chasing public is a fickle group; their taste varies, and
their ability2 and desire' to purchase is unpredictable.
Moreover, even a subdivision of moderate size requires
investment of substantial risk capital and the borrowing
of large sums at high interest rates.' At the same time,
the building industry does not readily lend itself to public,
broad-based financing. This is partly because of the risk
involved, but primarily due to the dependency of the
* Of the Virginia Bar; A.B. 1956, Bucknell University; LL.B. 1960,
Harvard University.
1The author's area of familiarity with the building industry is in the
metropolitan Washington, D.C., area, primarily in Northern Virginia.
Much of the discussion of the building industry is based upon the
author's own experience in the real estate business and upon interviews
with builders in this area.
2 Ability to purchase has always been affected by general and local
economic conditions. However, today the matter of government financing
is of utmost concern. One in the real estate industry Is aware of every
proposed change in FHA and VA terms. This awareness is often con-
verted into anticipatory action. The author knows of many instances in
which contracts of sale were based upon more favorable terms which
were to be enacted several months after the date of the contract.
3 An example of the multitude of things which may affect the pur-
chaser's desire to buy follows. In Arlington, Virginia, in 1958, enthusiasm
for buying was dampened by the fear that as a result of the court's order
to integrate the schools and Virginia's "Massive Resistance" policy, schools
would nb)t be opened. Thus many who would have bought a home in
Virginia instead purchased in Washington or its Maryland suburbs.
'For example, assuming an average proilt of 10% of cost and loans
of 75% of selling price, a builder of 100 houses in the $20,000 price range
will invest $200,000 to $300.000 and borrow up to $1,500,000. These figures
vary, of course, with local banking practice and with the number of
houses built under the same loan at the same time.
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enterprise on one or a few personalities for its success,
and the necessary localization and comparative smallness
of operation. This brief discussion suggests at least two
propositions. First, the closed nature of the enterprise
requires that investors be able to contribute large sums,
and this in turn usually means that the investors will be
high-bracket taxpayers. Second, the risk involved will
not be worth the taking if the high-bracket taxpayer must
report his gain at ordinary rates. However, with proper
tax planning most of the builder's gain will Tbe taxed at
long-term capital gain rates, with an overall net tax rate
somewhere between the 30 and 40 per cent range.
In order to understand the significance of proper plan-
ning, let us return to our two heroes, Ambitious (A)
and Backward (B). Assume that each builder builds about
100 houses a year on which his gain is $2,000 a house, or
$200,000 in all. B is an unincorporated taxpayer, or is an
incorporated taxpayer electing to be taxed under Sub-
chapter S. If he files separately and has deductions and
exclusions of $30,000, his tax on his net income of $170,000
is about $130,000, and he has about $40,000 left after
taxes. A utilizes the corporate form. Ideally, his ob-
jective is accomplished in the following manner:
1. A corporation is formed, and the houses are built
by it.
2. The corporation is liquidated before it earns any
income from the sale of the houses.
3. The houses, and other proceeds if any, are distributed
to A.
4. A pays a long-term capital gains tax on the difference
between the basis of his stock and the appreciated
value of the houses.'
5. The houses are sold by A, as an individual. He
realizes little or no gain because of his "stepped-up"
basis.7
Omitting personal deductions and exclusions, A's tax would
then be $50,000 and he would have a net gain, after taxes of
51954 I.R.C., Subchapter S, §§ 1371-1377, added by § 64, Technical
Amendments Acts of 1958, 72 STAT. 1650 (1958). All references hereafter
made to the CoDS and to statutory sections refer to the INaRAL RLTENUE
CODE OF 1954 or sections thereof, unless otherwise indicated.
§ 31.1§334 (a).
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$150,000. Although A's mode of operating was probably
capable of literal attainment prior to 1950,8 the amazing
thing is that by weaving a disciplined path through the
present statutory labyrinth, he can still approach the at-
tainment of this goal. The primary legal obstacle to the
accomplishment of the builder's objective is that the
property received in liquidation may be tainted by the
corporation's "collapsible" status, and thus taxed at or-
dinary rates.9
The purpose of this article is to ascertain the extent to
which the collapsible corporations provision, Section 341, is
applicable to the builder of residential subdivisions, and
if so, how its effect may be avoided or minimized. In view
of the extensive treatment already accorded the collapsible
corporation,0 the author's justification for further dis-
0195 is the date of enactment of § 117(m) (now 1 341). 1939 I.R.C.
1 117(m), added by 64 STAT. 934 (1950).
'While concentrating on § 341, the tax planner must also direct his
attention to two secondary problems: (1) Since use of the collapsible
plan encompasses an accumulation of earnings, it is conceivable that the
corporation may be subject to the accumulated earnings tax imposed
by § 531. Note particularly the problems presented by such cases as
United Business Corporation v. Commissioner, 62 F. 2d 754, 755 (2nd
Cir. 1933); Wellman Operating Corp., 33 T.C. 162 (1959); and Pelton
Steel Casting Co., 28 T.C. 153 (1957), aff'd 251 F. 2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958),
cert. den. 356 U.S. 958 (1958). Generally the builder is not subject to the
§ 531 tax because (a) an accumulation to reduce indebtedness is considered
a reasonable need, Gazette Telegraph 0o., 19 T.C. 692 (1953), and (b)
for all practical purposes, the tax does not apply in the year of liquidation.
See § 535(a) and 562(b). (2) After the liquidation contemplated by the
collapsible approach, the builder will desire to reincorporate and go
through the same cycle again. Such a reincorporation may result in an
assertion by the Commissioner that the new corporation is in reality a
continuation of the old, that a reorganization resulted, and that the boot
ancillary thereto is taxable at ordinary income rates. See Lewis v. Com-
missioner, 176 F. 2d 646, 648 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Love v. Commissioner, 113
F. 2d 236 (3rd Cir. 1940); William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220 (1954), rev'd
on other grounds 230 F. 2d 304 (6th Cir. 1956). Since the builder, unlike
the taxpayers in the above cases, does not use the same tangible assets in
successive enterprises, it is unlikely that this argument will apply to
him. Of course there are many other related problems, particularly those
posed by §§ 1551, 269, 482, 541-47, and 337. To minimize or eliminate the
corporate surtax, the planner's imagination is most challenged by the
multiple corporation problem. For an example of one who failed to meet
that challenge, see Alden Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959). See also James
Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F. 2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960), aff'g 176 F.
Supp. 306 (Minn. 1959) ; and Note, Problems of Multiple Corporations, 20
La. L. Rev. 761 (1960).
10E.g., Axelrad, Recent Developments in Collapsible Corporations, 36
Taxes 893 (1958); Axelrad, Tao Advantages and Pitfalls in Collapsible
Corporations and Partnerships, 34 Taxes 841 (1956); DeWind & Anthoine,
Collapsible Corporations, 56 Col. L. Rev. 475 (1956) ; Donaldson, Does the
"Two-Shot" Corporation Escape Collapsible Treatment under Section 341?,
8 J. Taxation 338 (1958); Donaldson, Collapsible Corporations, 36 Taxes
777 (1958) ; McLean, Collapsible Corporations - The Statute and Regula-
tions, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 55 (1953) ; Modrall, Collapsible Corporations and
Subsection (e), 37 Taxes 895 (1959) ; Salem, Collapsible Corporations: An
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cussion is two-fold. Although many articles and cases
dealing with Section 341 have discussed some aspect of
the building industry, few if any have considered, Section
341 in the context of the builder of residential subdivisions.
Moreover, little investigation has been directed to the
problem of determining whether the asserted loopholes in
Section 341 are in fact "plugged" by the economic in-
feasibility of utilizing them.
It has already been noted that A would like to have
the corporation build the houses, liquidate before any sales
are made, and distribute the houses to the shareholders at
capital gain rates, thus paying a net tax of 25 per cent
Section 117(m)," now Section 341, was enacted in 1950
with the ostensible purpose of preventing the achievement
of this low tax rate. In ascertaining whether 341 has ac-
complished its apparent purpose, two limitations must be
noted. First, no cases have been decided under the 1954
Code. Thus we must rely upon our own speculation and
that of others as to the effect of any changes in the 1954
Code.'2 The cases under the 1939 Code are neither nu-
merous, due to the section's late date of enactment, nor
illuminating, since the cases quite naturally reflect the
confusion of the statute. Moreover, many of the cases arose
in a special context, now otherwise provided for in the
1954 Code," and their value as precedents may be thereby
diminished. Second, Section 341 has been called "a classi-
cal example of a 'bad' tax statute,1 4 with the result that
reliance upon its literal provisions may be misplaced.
Analysis of the Past, Present and Proposed Collapsible (onwept8, 28 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 855 (1960); and Wilkes, Post Construction Deoision to
Sell Avoids Collapsibility, 13 J. Taxation 244 (1960).
"1939 I.R.C. § 117(m), added by 64 STAT. 934 (1950), as amended, 65
STAT. 497 (1951).
"The latest addition is § 341(e), added by the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958, § 20(a), 72 STAT. 1615 (1958). It covers four pages of the
CoDn and excepts from the operation of § 341 certain situations where
there is presumably no collapsible intent. Since the builder is one of the
objects of § 341, and since no tax saving is worth the effort required of
counsel in an attempt to understand this subsection, its provisions will be
ignored during the remainder of this article. However, one hearty soul
has made the attempt to understand subsection (e). See the article by
Modrall, supra, n. 10.
"These cases dealt with distributions by construction corporations which
had received government insured loans in excess of the cost of construc-
ion. This problem is now specifically covered by § 312(j).
" Axelrad, Tax Advantages and Pitfalls in Collapsible Corporations and
Partnerships, 34 Taxes 841, 847 (1956). The same thought was phrased
more picturesquely by Donaldson, supra, n. 10, 777:
"In the area of tax avoidance the collapsible corporation is a classic;
imagination, simplicity in form, and beauty in achieved result mark it
as such. The Treasury's legislative answer is grotesque."
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THE STATUTORY SCHEME
With these limitations in mind, let us proceed to ex-
amine the statutory scheme of Section 341 insofar as it is
relevant to the builder's problems. Section 341(a) pro-
vides that gain from the sale or exchange of stock or from
a distribution in complete or partial liquidation of a
collapsible corporation will be treated as ordinary income
to the extent that it would normally be treated as long
term capital gain. Section 341(b) defines a collapsible
corporation as follows:
"[T] he term 'collapsible corporation' means a corpora-
tion formed or availed of principally for the . . . con-
struction... of property... with a view to-
(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders
(whether in liquidation or otherwise), or a dis-
tribution to its shareholders, before the realization
by the corporation ... constructing... the prop-
erty of a substantial part of the taxable income to
be derived from such property, and
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain at-
tributable to such property."' 5
Section 341 (c) establishes a presumption that corporations
holding certain types of assets, which may be generally
categorized as appreciated "inventory" assets, are collap-
sible corporations. Little need be said about this subsection
since there is no doubt that the building corporation is
usually within it, and it is otherwise clear that the building
corporation is collapsible.'6
Section 341 (d) provides three situations in which gain
realized by a shareholder from a collapsible corporation
will not be taxed under 341 (a), although the corporation
remains collapsible. Thus 341 (a) is inoperative:
1. When the shareholder and his attributees own 5 per
cent or less of the stock,' or
mEmphasis added to indicate words and phrases which have been the
focal point of contention in litigation.1 6 Lewis S. Jacobson, 32 T.C. 893, rev'd. on other grounds, 281 F. 2d 703
(3rd Cir. 1960) ("Ordinarily a corporation will be considered collapsible
when its activity is principally construction and the construction is fol-
lowed by the shareholder's sale of their stock before the corporation
realizes a substantial part of the income to be derived from construction
and the shareholders realize gain attributable to -the constructed property.
Carl B. Rechner, 30 T.C. 186 (1958)."). See also infra, n. 58.
27 This subsection eliminates most publicly owned corporations from the
operation of 341.
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2. Unless more than 70 per cent of the gain recognized
by the shareholder from distributions received from
the corporation is attributable to the property "so
constructed," or
3. If the "gain is realized after the expiration of 3 years
following the completion of such . . . construc-
tion .... "
THE "VIw"
We have noted above that to come within the terms of
Section 341(b), the corporation must be formed or used
"with a view to" doing the collapsible act. Since we are
assuming that our builder has the collapsible "view," brief
mention only need be rendered the definition of that term."
Three questions are presented. First, to what extent
must the collapsible motive be the causative force in
adopting the action contemplated by the statute? Initially,
there was a feeling that "principally" might be interpreted
to modify "with a view to" instead of the phrase "for the
construction."'19 The provision of the Regulations on this
matter is all-encompassing, providing as follows:
"The requirement is satisfied whether the [collapsing]
action was contemplated unconditionally, conditionally,
or as a recognized possibility.
20
Although the possible invalidity of the Treasury's defini-
tion might be properly urged in an appropriate litigation,
the purpose of this article is not advanced by such a dis-
cussion.
The second question is whether the tax evoking "view"
is present if it arises at any time, or whether it is present
only if it arises prior to the completion of construction.
Here the Regulations take a position favorable to the tax-
payer,21 but some doubt as to the appropriateness of the
Commissioner's interpretation has been suggested by the
courts.22 In any event, the Commissioner's position is
Is The Tax Court has recently demonstrated that it will give little weight
to self-serving testimony or explanation by counsel of the nontax objec-
tives of the taxpayer. E.g., Jesse Hartman, 34 T.C. No. 111 (1960);
Aldon Homes Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959).
1Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F. 2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1958); Burge v.
Commissioner, 253 F. 2d 765, 768 fn. 2 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Weil v. Commis-
sioner, 252 F. 2d 805 (2nd Cir. 1958).
20Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (2) (1955).
=Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (3) (1955).
" "Since the corporaltion may at anytime during its corporate life be
'availed of' for the proscribed purpose . . ., it seems surprising that the
regulations have adopted a narrower view of the statute . . . We are
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limited to circumstances which could not be reasonably
anticipated during construction, and may be hedged
through the use of his niggardly interpretation of when
construction is "completed."23 A third problem concerning
the necessary "view" will be discussed in the next section
of this article.
SUBSTANTIA REAimAToN
The most important limitation within Section 341 (b) is
that the collapsible action take place "before the realization
by the corporation ... of a substantial part of the taxable
income to be derived from such property." This dis-
armingly simple definition raises several questions. What
is the relation between "substantial" and, "view"? Does
"substantial" refer to the income realized, or to that left
unrealized, prior to the collapse of the corporation? What
percentage is "substantial"? And, how is the total taxable
income to be computed?
1. The Relation Between "Substantial" and "View".
A literal construction of the statute would mean that
"substantial part" would modify "with a view to," with
the result that Section 341(a) would be operative when-
ever there was an intent to collapse the corporation before
a substantial part of the taxable income was realized, re-
gardless of whether or not a substantial part of the income
actually was realized. The issue has received little atten-
tion in the cases. Even if a literal interpretation were ac-
cepted by the courts, it would be of small consequence
since, as one author suggested, "because of the difficulty
disposed to disagree with so narrow an interpretation [of the statute]."
Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F. 2d 108, 111 (2nd Cir. 1958) (dictim).
Accord, Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F. 2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Sidney
v. Commissioner, 273 F. 2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1960); Burge v. Commissioner,
253 F. 2d, 765 (4th Cir. 1958) (dictim). See also Jesse Hartman, 34 T.C.
No. 111 (1960) ; E. J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1114 (1959) ; Carl B. Rechner, 30
T.C. 186 (1958). Contra, Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F. 2d 703 (3rd
Cir. 1960), rev'g 32 T.C. 893. A comment on 'the latter case is Wilkes, Post
Construotion Decision to Sell Avoid8 Collapsibility, 13 J. Taxation 244
(1960). The Tax Court recently followed the Regulations, noting that the
question of their validity was not raised. Charles v. Riley, 35 T.C. No.
95 (Feb. 28, 1961); Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. No. 101 (March 13, 1961).
m Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 178, Indicates that construction will
not be considered as completed for purposes of the three year limitation
until every "integral constructing" act is completed, such as zoning. This
same reasoning may also be applied to the determination of whether the
post construction motive is really post. See Max Mintz, 32 T.C. 723 (1959),
aff'd 284 F. 2d 554 (2rd Cir. 1960).
1961]
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of proof of state of mind, actual occurrences are likely
to be the practical basis for the application of the sec-
tion.,2 4
2. "Substantial" or "Insubstantial"?
A more significant problem is posed by Abbott v. Com-
missioner:25
"The real question posed by the statute, however, is
not whether a substantial part of the total profit was
realized prior to the dissolution, but rather whether that
part of the total profit realized 'after' dissolution was
substantial. '2
Apparently, this is an acceptance of the Commissioner's
argument that the limitation is satisfied only if "the amount
of the unrealized taxable income from such property is not
substantial in relation to the taxable income realized."27
The argument of the Third Circuit is based upon a belief that
the statutory purpose would be frustrated by a literal in-
terpretation since such would result in a net tax approach-
ing the long-term capital gain rate. The Tax Court2" and
a District Court29 take a different view of the statute,
reading it more literally. Thus they say that the statute is
satisfied if a substantial part of the income is realized
prior to dissolution. The same result would follow from
the application of either test if, for example, 60 per cent.
were determined to be substantial. If, however, substan-
tial is some percentage lower than 50 per cent., the view
which prevails may be outcome-determinative.
3. What Percentage is Substantial?
In other contexts, "substantial" has been held to range
from 2 per cent. to 50 per cent.30 Considering the purpose
"4 MacLean, Collapsible Corporations - The Statute and Regulations, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 55, 67 (1953). But see Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.
2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F. 2d 617, 622 (5th
Cir. 1959).
Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F. 2d 537 (3rd Cir. 1958).
Id., 542. It should' be noted, however, that the amount realized here was
only 10%, a figure which would not be "substantial" under either test.
"Reg. § 1.341-5(c) (2) (1955).
2James B. Kelly, 32 T.C. 135 (1959), on appeal to 5th Circuit. The
Tax Court, with its customary disrespect for its multiheaded master, re-
buked the Third Circuit for misinterpreting Its own decision In Abbott.
The Second Circuit has reserved decision on the point. Sidney v. Commis-
sioner, 273 F. 2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1960).
"Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
10 See cases cited, MacLean, supra, n. 24, 68, fn. 20.
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of Congress in enacting Section 341, the figure will prob-
ably tend toward the latter percentage. One author states
that until recently informal letter rulings were readily
available, designating 50 per cent. as substantial, but that be-
cause of friction within the Internal Revenue Service, these
rulings are no longer available." Several of the commenta-
tors think 50 per cent. to be a reasonable figure,82 and the
Levenson case so held:
"Giving to the word 'substantial' its ordinarily ac-
cepted meaning, it is inconceivable to this court that the
realization of more than 50% of the net income from
the property should not be regarded as substantial."88
No contrary authority exists. The Abbott case only said
10.84 per cent. was not enough. 4 The Tax Court in James
B. Kelly," which involved the collapse of a corporation
that bought and subdivided real estate, held that 33%
per cent. was substantial, and in G. A. Heft held that 17.07
per cent. was insubstantial." It is worth noting that even
the dissenters in the Kelly case did not disagree with the
Levenson result. Thus, for the present, it appears that the
taxpayer can rely upon 50 per cent. being considered sub-
stantial.
One word of caution should be added. Even if one
receives a firm ruling from the Treasury that, for exam-
ple, 45 per cent. is acceptable in his particular case, the
ruling is not binding upon questions of valuation. The
Commissioner's valuation may be different, or values may
change at a crucial time. The latter may be illustrated by
the following example. Assume that one hundred houses
are built and that a profit of $2000 per house is anticipated.
After selling fifty houses upon which the profit is that
predicted, the corporation liquidates. Thereafter, a steel
strike or a Korean War causes values to wobble upward,
so that the profit on the last fifty houses is actually $3,000
a house. Since the percentage realized before liquidation is
only 40 per cent., the taxpayer would not have satisfied
the substantial limitation. Thus the taxpayer may be well
advised to hedge with some percentage greater than fifty.
Axelrad, Taz Advantages and Pitfalls in Collapsible Corporations and
Partnerships, 34 Taxes 841 (1956).
2 See e.g., DeWind & Antholne, Collapsible Corporations, 56 Col. L. Rev.
475, 489 (1956); Donaldson, Does the "Two-Shot" Corporation Escape
Collapsible Treatment Under Section 341F, 8 J. Taxation 338 (1958).
$Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244, 250-51 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
See supra, n. 26.
8132 T.C. 135 (1959), on appeal to 5th Circuit.
34 T.C. 86 (1960).
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4. What Constitutes the "Income To Be Derived
From Such Property"?
We have determined that 50 per cent. is probably sub-
stantial realization, but 50 per cent. of what? The statute
says, "a substantial part of the taxable income to be de-
rived from such property.""' It is simple enough to com-
pute the realized portion of the gain, but the question is,
how do you compute the unrealized portion? Until re-
cently, the formula was assumed to be that proposed (by
Levenson.
"The only feasible test is to add- to the taxable income
already realized the additional taxable income that
would be realized by the corporation if it sold the
collapsible property [upon the date of collapse] .",
However, at least two commentators and several courts
have suggested a "projection" theory. The theory is well
stated by Axelrad:
"The Statute suggests that the comparison is between
what the property has already realized with what it
would realize had it not been liquidated. This would
in turn require a projection, during the life of the
assets, of overhead and other costs ....
The Tax Court first suggested acceptance of the projection
theory in Rose Sidney.40 Here, distributions to shareholders,
neither in liquidation nor redemption, but in excess of
earnings and profits, were taxed under Section 341 when
the distribution was attributable to the excess of FHA
loans over the cost of constructing apartment buildings.
The court held that since the useful life of the buildings
was thirty years, rent income for only two years could
not be a "substantial part" of the income to be derived from
the property. Payne v. Commissioner,4 was another FiA
case in which a distribution in redemption was taxed under
Section 341. Although the corporation had rented its apart-
ments for seven years, the court in a dictum said that "a
substantial part of the income of the corporations remained
to be realized over the thirty-five remaining years of their
§ 341(b) (1) (A). Emphasis added.
"Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244, 250 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
"See supra, n. 31, 861. A similar formulation is given by Donaldson,
supra, n. 10, 782.
"030 T.C. 1155 (1958), aff'd 273 F. 2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1960).
1268 F. 2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959), aff'g 30 T.C. 1037 (1958).
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expected life." 2 The most recent case, R. A. Byran,43 gives
further support:
"The net income which would normally be anticipated
in the instant situation would consist of rental income
over the life of the property or of the lease. The lease
... was for a term of 75 years .... At the times of the
redemptions herein (after 1 years of rent) the corpo-
rations would not have realized substantial parts of the
total net income to be derived from the properties over
their useful lives.""
Despite these stalwart authorities, the author believes
that the builder of a subdivision will be unaffected by
their logic. In all three cases the property continued to
exist in the corporation after the collapsible action. Fur-
ther, the shareholders taxed continued to retain an interest
in the corporation, and thus indirectly in the property,
after the collapse. Arguably, it is a quite different case
when the corporation is liquidated and the property is sold
to someone else. Aside from a feeling that privity of re-
lationship no longer exists between the shareholders, the
corporation and the property, the shareholders no longer
have any control over the income producing capabilities of
the property. Perhaps a more persuasive distinction can be
made as to the type of property involved. In all three
cases, the property was rent-income producing, and
usually bought primarily for the purpose of receiving the
income from it. However, the builder of residential housing
builds property primarily for sale.45 It is difficult to say
that rental income from the property should be projected
over its life when the normal pattern is to derive gain from
the sale of the property. Even if rent were to be projected,
substantial realization may occur since the rental of single
dwelling houses is usually not a profitable business.40 Thus
it is the author's opinion that the Levenson test is still
valid when applied to builders of residential housing.
"Id., 622.
"32 T.C. 104 (1959), aff'd 281 F. 2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960).
Id., 127.
4Especially is this true as the cost and value of the house go up. For
example, in Northern Virginia a $10,000 house may rent for $90 to $110
a month while a $30,000 house will only rent for about $200 a month.
"It has been the experience of the property management department of
The Groom Company, Inc., of Arlington, Virginia, that after the payment
of taxes, insurance, mortgage amortization, interest, agent's commission
(7% of rent), and repair and redecorating expenses, the owner of a
moderate to high-priced house just about breaks even. Moreover, it is
not uncommon for the house to remain vacant between tenants for a period
of thirty to sixty days.
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5. Some Practical Considerations.
Even if the builder's corporation(s) is (are) not col-
lapsible when liquidated, some other practical problems
exist. Some provision will have to be made for paying the
capital gains tax on the houses received in liquidation.
If the corporation has received a substantial part of the
income, the cash distribution will be sufficient to take
care of this. Aside from the valuation problem mentioned
above, valuation presents one other difficulty. Assume
that the builder receives houses which he values at $20,000
and pays a long-term capital gains tax based upon this
valuation. He has now acquired a new basis in the houses
of $20,000. If he should sell the houses for $21,000, he may
have to pay an ordinary tax on the $1,000 difference, al-
though it is not clear that this is so.47 If instead he sells
the houses for $19,000 he may find that he is unable to
use the entire loss.48
The practical consideration most commonly raised by
builders interviewedsa was the difficulty of building a
hundred houses while only being able to sell fifty. Many
large builders in the Washington, D.C. area are presently
able to sell their houses as each is completed.4" Delaying
the sale of houses means that risk capital is static and
that interest payments on outstanding construction loans
will be larger than usual. Further, the sales problem is
more difficult if the builder must withhold the sale of
one-half of the constructed 'houses until liquidation since
the purchasing public and sales agents will lose interest
during the time gap." To be matched against these very
real disadvantages are some distinct benefits which will
result from a time lag. For example, the grass has an
1 t Axelrad apparently believes that ordinary income would result. Tax
Advantages and Pitfalls in Collapsible Corporations and Partnerships,
34 Taxes 841, 873 (1956). However, the trend tof the cases seems to be in
the opposite direction. Alabama Land Mineral Co. v. Commissioner, 250
F. 2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Curtis Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F. 2d 167 (3rd
Cir. 1956) ; 'Greenspan v. Commissioner, 229 F. 2d 947 (8th Cir. 1966), and
cases cited therein. But of. Estate of Barios, 29 T.C. 378 (1957).
"8 Here we will enjoy the prospect of the Commissioner arguing that the
asset is capital, and thus a capital loss results which the taxpayer can't set
off against other ordinary gains.
See supra, n. 1.
During periods of shortage, such as the Korean War, houses were sold
before the roof was on. Even today a few builders whose products are in
particular demand sell their houses several months in advance of com-
pletion.
01 This will in turn require more advertising expense since the time gap
will entail the loss of advertising carryover.
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opportunity to grow, and the subdivision may lose a little
of the customary raw look. Some of the fifty purchasers
who are pleased may be able to entice some of their friends
to purchase in the new area."' Naturally, it is impossible
for the author to resolve this problem, and all that can be
offered is that each builder will have to work out a flexible
plan according to his own abilities and inclinations. The
model outlined below approaches perfection, and it is
sufficient to add that the "build and liquidate" plan is still
advantageous to the high-bracket builder if only a few
houses are distributed in kind in the liquidating dividend.
Builder A has successfully navigated the collapsible
provision, using the "substantial" limitation. He has built
a hundred houses upon which he has made a profit of $2,000
a house. He has utilized four corporations, thus keeping
the corporate tax down to the minimum 30 per cent. rate.
After building the houses and selling fifty of them, he has
liquidated the corporation. How has he fared?
Gain by the corporations on the sale of
50 h ou ses ........................................................... $100,000
Corporate tax ...................................... $30,000
Tax upon $70,000 balance distributed in
liquidation ...................................... 17,500
Tax on distribution of houses
in k in d ............................................... 25 ,000
T otal T ax .............................................. $72,500
Gain on appreciation of distributed houses .... $100,000
T otal gain .............................................................. $200,000
Net tax rate .................... $ 72,000 or 36.25%
$200,000
The "70-30" rule.
The other major manner of hurdling the consequences
of Section 341(a) is through the utilization of Section
341 (d) (2) and the so-called "70-30" rule contained therein.52
"In West Grass Ridge, McLean, Virginia, at least 50% of the 75 pur-
chasers were influenced in their decision to purchase by the fact that
friends had purchased there.
"Much of the comment herein is based upon an expansion of or dis-
agreement with Donaldson, Doe8 the "Two-Shot" Corporation E8cape
Collapsible Treatment under Section 341F, 8 J. Taxation 338 (1958).
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Section 341(d), unlike Section 341(b), eliminates the
collapsible consequences to the qualifying shareholder
for the distribution in question, but does not elimi-
nate the collapsible status of the corporation. Sec-
tion 341 (d) (2) provides that gain recognized by a share-
holder during the taxable year with respect to his stock
in a collapsible corporation, shall not be within the re-
sults attached by Section 341 unless more than 70 per cent.
of the gain "is attributable to the property so . ..con-
structed. ..."
The Regulations say that "property so... constructed"
means the "property referred to in section 341 (b) (1) .""
This property, hereinafter described as "collapsible,"" is
on the "70" side of the equation, while other property,
which will be described as "non-collapsible," is on the
"30" side. Non-collapsible property may consist of that
type of property generally not within the provisions of
Section 341(b) (3),1 5 such as investments in other busi-
nesses. This may take the form of stock"6 or the assets of
another business, such as a hardware store."7 Possibly,
completely unimproved land would come within this
definition."5
The other type of non-collapsible asset is property which
would be collapsible but for the fact that a sufbstantial
13Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (1) (1955).
64This term may be slightly inaccurate, but is convenient. It is not to
be confused with "section 341 assets" referred to in § 341(b) (3).
51§341(b) (1) refers to 341(b) (3).
"Although § 341(c) (2) (C) eliminates stock from the 341(c) Computa-
tion, the statute gives no indication that stock may not be used for the
"70-30" computation.
m Since much that the builder purchases must or may come from a hard-
ware store, this is not an unusual side business.
m Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F. 2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959); Glickman v.
Commissioner, 256 F. 2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1958) ; W. H. Weaver, 32 T.C. 66
(1959) ; Elizabeth M. August, 30 T.C. 969 (1958), aff'd 267 F. 2d 829 (3rd
Cir. 1959) ; Donaldson, Collapsible Corporations, 36 Taxes 777 (1958).
However, it is also clear that if the appreciation in the raw land is
caused by its relation to the constructed property, such as an undeveloped
tract adjacent to or part of a developed tract, or the very property upon
which the construction takes place, the raw land will be treated as a
collapsible asset. Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F. 2d 108 (2nd Cir.
1958); Erwin Gerber, 32 T.C. 1199 (1959); Max Mintz, 32 T.C. 723
(1959), aff'd 284 F. 2d 554 (2nd Cir. 1960) ; Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (3) (1955).
See also Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F. 2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960), cert
applied for (construing "attributable" broadly). The Maryland builder
may be able to argue that his land should not be tainted since he often
retains the land in order to receive the ground rents and it is thus not an
inventory type asset.
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part of the income has been derived from the property.
Within this category, there are two types of assets. As-
sume that the assets of A consist of three subdivisions of
fifty houses each, each subdivision being located several
miles from either of the others, and one apartment building.
The apartment building is one asset, and according to the
Regulations, each of the subdivisions is a separate asset.
Thus, the Regulations specify:
"Where any such property is a unit of an integrated
project involving several properties similar in kind, the
determination shall be made .. .by reference to the
aggregate of the properties constituting the single
project."' 9
Assuming the 50 per cent. test to be valid, if one-half of
the houses in one subdivision are sold by the corporation,
then substantial realization has occurred with regard to
that "property." Now assume that each of the subdivisions
has a total possible gain of $100,000 and, that the apartment
house has a projected gain of $100,000, so that the total
gain will be $400,000. Assume further that two of the sub-
divisions have earned $60,000 each, the third $80,000, and
that the apartment house has no earnings. If the corpora-
tion were now collapsed, the substantial limitation would
not apply although 50 per cent. of the total income has
been earned.60 As we shall see, the distribution would
qualify under the "70-30" rule.
With the above distinctions in mind, how is the "70-30"
computed? Let us use the same example with three added
facts: (1) $150,000 in corporate and other taxes has been
paid from the earnings of the three subdivisions; (2)
$10,000 has been earned by investing the balance of the
earnings of the three subdivisions; and (3) a dividend of
$30,000 has been distributed. When substantial realization
has occurred with respect to any one "property," the entire
income, earned and to be earned, from that property is
placed on the "30" side. Surplus attributable to that in-
come is also placed on the same side. The computation6'
may then be outlined as follows:
Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (4) (1955).
®The Regulations also provide that "reference shall be made to each
property." Ibid. Thus it is apparently the view of the Regulations that
to come within the substantial limitation, there must be substantial realiza-
tion with respect to each asset.
"See Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (4) (1955).
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Portion of gain attributable to non-
collapsible property:
1. House sales from 3 subdivisions $300,000
Plus investment income .............. 10,000
T otal ................................................ $310,000
2. Less:
Taxes ............................ $150,000
Dividends .................... 30,000
Total subtractions ........................ $180,000
Portion of gain on "30" side ................................ $130,000
Portion of gain attributable to appreciation
of collapsible property ........................................ 100,000
Total gain to shareholder ........................................ $230,000
Percentage of total gain attributable to collap-
sible property .................... $100,000 or 43.3%
$230,000
Since the percentage is not more than 70 per cent, the
entire distribution is not within section, 341. Note that
taxes, surplus, and dividends affect the application of the
"70-30" rule, whereas they do not affect the substantial
limitation.2
Several suggestions have been made as to the various
means of utilizing the "70-30" rule. MacLean states one
such method:
"An exchange of low-basis investment property for
stock at the time of formation of the corporation in
order that 30% of the gain on sale or liquidation will
be attributable to that property has [some] promise of
success."
63
Thus, if A happens to own 1000 shares of IBM worth $400
per share and with a basis of $100 per share, the corpora-
tion will take his basis in the shares6 4 and his basis in
See also the explanation In Donaldson, supra, n. 52, 339.
MacLean, 8upra, n. 24, 80.8 § 362.
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the corporation's shares will be adjusted accordingly- 5
Upon distribution of the shares in liquidation, he will then
report the capital gain attributable to these shares, and if
his total gain is $100,000 or more, the "70-30" rule will
make the entire gain outside the operation of 341 (a). One
difficulty with this approach is that the courts may merely
say that stock in another corporation is not the type of
property referred to by Section 341(d) (2). A second
difficulty is that such an approach may run afoul of the
accumulated earnings tax provision since there is no rea-
sonable need for the retention of the stock."6 A's situation
in regard to the Section 531 tax might be improved slightly
if the low basis assets were of the non-liquid type, such
as the assets of a hardware business. Perhaps the earnings
tax will be inapplicsble for some other reason. If the
low basis asset is raw land upon which the builder will
someday build, the objections suggested above are mini-
mized further, but A may be in trouble when he rein-
corporates. 67 Although the difficulties are apparent, this
approach may be worth considering if the builder's finan-
cial situation lends itself to this pattern" and the safer
alternative discussed below is unavailable.
The use of the "70-30" rule which has the most promise
of success is through the "two-shot" corporation. As
illustrated above, the two-shot is accomplished by build-
ing two or more separate and distinct housing develop-
ments, realizing a substantial part of the income with re-
spect to one of them, and then liquidating at such a time
that the gain to the shareholder from the collapsible sub-
division does not exceed 70 per cent. of the total gain.
Although the "two-shot" corporation seems quite within
the statutory language as implemented by the Regulations,
several builders interviewed suggested some substantial
- § 358.
wSee supra, n. 9. It would seem that the accumulated earnings tax
would not apply if the stocks were used as security for a more favorable
construction loan. Also, § 543(a) (1) classifies income from stocks, and
§ 543(a) (2) income from the sale or exchange of stocks as personal
holding company income. However, the amount of non-holding company
income from the sale of houses ought to avoid any danger of a personal
holding company tax. See also § 542(a) (2), which excludes from the
operation of the provision corporations in which six or more shareholders
own more than 50% of the stock.
0' The presence of a tangible asset may help the Commissioner in his
argument that a reorganization with taxable boot was effected. See 8upra,
n. 9.
68 When this general approach was suggested to one builder, he appro-
priately replied, "I don't happen to have 1000 shares of IBM with a basis
of $100 a share."
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practical difficulties. The primary criticism offered was
that two distinct operations would entail extra expendi-
tures. The principal economy effected by the subdivision
operation results from the utilization of mass production
methods within a small geographic area. As the operation
becomes decentralized labor costs are increased since part
of the labor time is spent between jobs. Needless to say,
effective supervision of the construction process is also
impeded when the work is decentralized. Advertising ex-
pense 9 may be almost doubled when the two subdivisions
are advertised during the same period since different out-
door signs must be used, and the two subdivisions may lend
themselves to separate newspaper advertising. Contractual
costs may also be increased if, for example, two fifty acre
tracts are developed instead of one hundred acre tract.
Thus, two sewer lines would have to be brought in for the
former but only one for the latter. Similarly, street costs
are usually greater when two tracts are involved. Build-
ing permits and other county costs may to some extent
depend upon the number of houses within the same plat.
Many other extra costs are possible.7" Of course, one
answer to these arguments might be that the two subdi-
visions need not be built simultaneously. However,
successive building raises other problems. If the houses
from the first subdivision are sold, and the profits re-
tained by the corporation while the second subdivision is
built, chances that the accumulated earnings tax will be
imposed are increased since, inter alia, the life span of
the corporation is increased. The added cost of allowing
houses to remain unsold has already received mention.
Perhaps the short answer is that tax-saving devices do en-
tail extra cost, and that the ultimate decision as to their
utilization depends upon balancing the potential saving
and the risk involved against the extra cost.
Another way suggested by Donaldson of utilizing the
"two-shot" is to build houses on one portion of a plot of
Many builders pay for their own advertising expense, while others pay
advertising expense only indirectly through the sales commissions. This
does not depend, upon whether or not the builder has his own sales or-
ganization, since it is often part of the agreement between builder and
broker that the former will pay for advertising. The mode of advertising
also varies with each builder. Some rely extensively upon newspaper ad-
vertising. Others feel that this very expensive form of advertising brings
out only the "Sunday" and "professional" lookers, and instead rely almost
solely upon outdoor directional signs, brochures to people moving Into the
area, and word of mouth.
70 Two different locations may lend themselves to two different types and
price ranges of houses. This obviously will increase the architect's fee and
labor costs.
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land, sell the houses, and with the proceeds from their
sale build a shopping center upon a remaining corner.'
Then lease the various shops, and sell the stock or liquidate
the corporation. Under the Regulation's definition of prop-
erty,' 7 the housing subdivision and the shopping center
will be two separate assets. Since more than 30 per cent.
of the gain to the shareholder will be attributable to the
non-collapsible asset, i.e., the subdivision, the entire dis-
tribution will be taxed at capital rates. Since the situation
in which a shopping center may be built upon the corner
of a subdivision is comparatively unusual, the primary
objection to this plan is its general lack of utility. If the
subdivision is at all isolated from other housing, it will
have to be rather large to sustain the shopping center.
But regardless of its size, zoning restrictions or the fact
that the area is already adequately served may mean that
the shopping center variation cannot be used.73
The 5 Per Cent. and the Three Year Exceptions.
Two other exceptions to the general operation of Section
341 are provided in Section 341 (d). The first requires but
brief mention. Section 341(d) (1) provides for the inap-
plicability of the section to shareholders owning 5 per cent.
or less of the shares. The definition of "shareholder" in-
cludes the attribution rules.74 Due to the closed nature of
the enterprise, most of the investors in the building corpo-
ration will usually own considerably more than 5 per cent.
The section may be of use to the occasional investor or to
the attorney or architect whose fee is paid in shares of
stock.75
Section 341 (d) (3) provides for the inapplicability of
Section 341 "to gain realized after the expiration of 3 years
following the completion of such... construction." Thus
one possibility would be to rent all the houses in the sub-
division for the required period. High rent would be ob-
tained because of the new house condition. Accelerated
Donaldson, supra, n. 52, 340.
See supra, n. 60.
'1 Donaldson, supra, n. 52, suggests two other variations of the "two-shot."
The redemption part of the "Two-shot Corporation with Redemption Out"
will 'be discussed infra. The fourth variation which he suggests is the
"Parent-Subsidiary 'Two-shot' Combination."
71 With certain additions, attribution rules are the same as those in
§ 544(a). Under the 1939 Code the per cent was 10% rather than 5%.
For a case involving this provision, see 'Butler v. Patterson, 148 F. Supp.
197 (Ala. 1957).
11 Of course part of the payment of stock to the attorney will be compen-
sation for services.
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depreciation could be taken on the houses while held by
the corporation. At the end of the three year period, the
corporation would be liquidated and all of the houses dis-
tributed in liquidation. Not only would the profit from
building the houses be taken in long-term capital gains,
but the corporation could take an ordinary deduction for
accelerated depreciation, and the difference would be "paid
back" at capital rates.
The primary legal difficulty with this scheme is. the
Commissioner's definition of "completed."76 Construction is
not completed until every "integral step in the construc-
tion" is completed. Thus the Commissioner held that con-
struction of a shopping center was "completed" when a
zoning petition was issued after a two-year hiatus. The
three-year period could then begin to run "if the corpora-
tion has no other construction activity with relation to the
land subsequent to the date the rezoning became final.""7
Since our entire subdivision will be regarded as one asset,7
and since some construction activity will remain until every
house is built, presumably the three year period will not
run on any of the houses until all are built. Thus, in a
subdivision taking three years to build, the first house
built would have to be rented for five to six years.
If the builder is willing to have his investment tied, up
for this period of time, the decision as to the use of this
plan then turns upon his estimate of the economic con-
siderations. Primary among these is the question of the
price for which the houses will sell in six years. This in
turn will depend upon two factors. The first is the national
and local economic situation at that time. If there is a
depression, or even a recession, the builder will be badly
hurt. This should not be a substantial impediment since
this is a risk which always faces a long-term investor. Of
course, since the builder is normally a short-term investor,
his risk is increased. But in view of the present, generally
optimistic attitude toward the national economy, the
builder may believe that the local economic situation pre-
sents the more serious risk. The main industry in a town
may close,79 thereby depressing the real estate market. A
factory, or an industrial development may be built nearby,
" Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 178.
7Ibid.
"Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (4) (1955).
"This is hardly the fear of those in the Metropolitan Washington, D.C.,
area. One of the favorite sales pitches for this area is that even in a
depression the government will grow, and that because the Washington
economy is based upon the government, it is the most stable in the country.
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thus making the particular neighborhood less desirable.
These and many other such factors will be considered by
the builder in making his decision.
More terrifying to the builder is the effect which renting
the houses may have upon their sales price three to six
years hence. In Northern Virginia, realtors usually esti-
mate that one who purchases a new house, and subse-
quently sells it in three to six years, will sell it for more
than he paid. Discounting any improvements which the
homeowner may make, the subdivision generally has a
more settled appearance after several years. Trees, grass
and shrubbery will grow. On the other hand, one leasing
a house does not have the same incentive to improve the
property, or even to maintain it in its present condition.
Aside from the usual precautions which the landlord takes,
such as the security deposit, the type of arrangement sug-
gested calls for more ingenious planning. First, the lessor
of a new house should have his choice of tenants, and this
choice should be exercised with care. There are people
who take pride in the manner in which their property is
maintained regardless of any material advantages they
may or may not reap thereby."' Second, a way may 'be
found by which the lessee may be motivated to give the
property greater care. When, the houses are initially
rented, a rental agreement with an option to buy may be
offered."s Perhaps the imaginative builder could, conceive
a plan by which lessees are rewarded for maintenance or
improvements which increase the value of the property.8 2
A third planning feature to be considered is the cost of
redecorating at the termination of the lease. The houses
may have to be repainted, 3 and certain minor repairs
made. Or, instead of waiting until the end of the lease, the
builder may decide that in some respects it is wiser to
have his own maintenance staff. This staff would be
80 Although the manner in which the "sheep are separated from the goats"
is something of a mystery. It is the experience of many realtors that not
much can be told in this regard from personal appearance or position. If
practical, the most reliable method is to check with previous landlords.
81 Query the result of exercising the option after the corporation is
liquidated - will the income from the sale be considered the corporation's
or the transferee's?
2 Or perhaps more realistically, by which the builder helps to defray the
cost of such improvements. For example, he might contribute to the pur-
chase of shrubbery, or share the cost of having a recreation room finished.
8BThis expense will vary considerably with houses and geographic loea-
tions. 'Most builders in the Washington area would only have to consider
Interior painting since it is an area where the houses are predominantly
brick. New England' builders, would have the added expense of painting
the exterior of the house.
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primarily concerned with that type of maintenance which,
if not undertaken immediately, would ultimately lead, to
more serious damage.14
Another expenditure which renting entails is property
management. The houses must be rented, rent collected
and the expenses resulting from retained ownership paid.
The builder may prefer to do this himself, or he may turn
the whole project over to a realtor. Although the realtor
in the Washington area usually charges individual home-
owners 7 per cent. for this service, the fee would be con-
siderably reduced if a large package deal were offered the
realtor, especially if it also involved the agency for the
eventual sale of the houses.
This plan, then, involves numerous risks and extra
planning. It should be noted, that if successful, the reward
is correspondingly increased. Unlike either the "substan-
tial realization" plan or the "70-30" device, this method
allows liquidation before the corporation earns income
from the sale of any of the houses, Further, the low re-
turn upon the investment during the years of rental may
be more than offset by the accelerated depreciation deduc-
tion allowed during that period.
8 5
Redemption.
One other possible method of avoiding the conse-
quences of Section 341 mentioned by some commenta-
tors 6 is through the utilization of a Section 302 re-
demption. There are numerous cases under the 1939
Code holding Section 117(m) applicable to redemptions."s
However, Section 341(a) (2) of the 1954 Code provides that
ordinary income will result from:
S... a distribution in partial or complete liquidation
of a collapsible corporation, which distribution is
The commencement of an intrusion by termites is a ready example.
See § 543 (a) (7). Although the personal holding company tax may
be levied on rent income, it may only be applied if the rent income con-
stitutes less than 50% of the corporation's gross income. Here, during the
years of the corporate existence, rent income will be 100% of total income.
See also § 543(a) (6).
8 DeWind & Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 56 Col. L. Rev. 475, 480
(1956) ; Donaldson, supra, n. 52.
OrYE.g., Bryan v. Commissioner, 281 F. 2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960); Payne
v. Commissioner, 268 F. 2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959) ; August v. Commissioner,
267 F. 2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1959); Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F. 2d 765
(4th Cir. 1958) ; W. H. Weaver, 32 T.C. 66 (1959). See also Jesse Hartman,
34 T.C. No. 111 (1960); and Arthur Pompanlo, 33 T.C. 1072 (1960), on
appeal to 4th Circuit.
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treated under this part as in part of full payment in
exchange for stock.""8
"[T]his part" is Part II, whereas Section 302 dealing with
redemptions is in Part I of the chapter. Thus a strict
interpretation of the section would exclude redemptions
from its operation. Should the attitude manifested by Judge
Magruder in Granite Trust Co. v. United States9 toward a
strict construction of the Code be applied in this area, the
taxpayer would have another sizable out. The author be-
lieves such a construction to be extremely unlikely. The
exemption of redemptions from the operation of the sec-
tion would go a long way toward defeating the purpose
for which it was enacted. Although this argument does
not always save a statute from destruction when the
court feels that the legislature is participating in a
masochistic exercise, the "redemption argument" seems to
have at least one gaping technical hole. Section 302 pro-
vides for capital gain treatment for certain redemptions
not "essentially equivalent to a dividend." 0 Section 346,
defines partial liquidations, and in conjunction with Section
318, provides for capital gain treatment for partial liquida-
tions if:
"(1) the distribution is one of a series of distributions
in redemption of all of the stock of the corporation
pursuant to a plan, or
(2) the distribution is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend, is in redemption of part of the stock of a
corporation pursuant to a plan.. .."
Section 346(c) gives explicit recognition to the fact that
the same fact situation may fall under both Sections 302
and 346. Thus, due to the blurred line between the two
sections, it would seem that the utilization of a redemption
to collapse the corporation could almost always be treated
by the court or the commissioner as within the vague
definition of a partial liquidation. It is recommended that
no reliance be placed upon the redemption technique or
argument.
Emphasis added.
M 238 F. 2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956). Judge Magruder's approach Is defended
by Professor Brown, Viginti Annorum Luoubrattones: The Tax Deotiion8 of
Judge Calvert Magruder, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1225, 1242 (1959), and criticized
by Professor Surrey, CCH FED. TAx. CURRENT LAW Am> -PRAOicm (Surrey
& Warren ed. 1958) No. 1154.
9* The section specifically provides that a determination that the dis-
tribution is "essentially equivalent to a dividend" does not necessarily make
§ 302(a) inoperative, but this may be an awkward trick for the courts to
perform. See § 302(b) (5).
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The Section 337 Hedge.
One last suggestion may be made to cautious counsel.
The substantial realization test may be combined with
Section 337 to provide a hedge in borderline cases. Assume
that the corporation sells 50 per cent. of the houses, realizing
50 per cent. of the gain. A plan of liquidation pursuant to
Section 337 is then adopted, and the remainder of the
houses are sold by the corporation. If the Commissioner
or the court determines that the corporation is not col-
lapsible, the same result follows as if Section, 337 had not
been used and 50 per cent. of the houses, had been dis-
tributed in liquidation. If the Commissioner determines
that the corporation is collapsible, Section 337 is then
inapplicable"' and the gain from the sale of the property
is included in the taxable income of the corporation.
"However, since the corporation has realized all of the
taxable income from its property, the stockholders gain
upon liquidation would not constitute ordinary income
within the purview of section, 341 of the code."' 2 The
catch, as far as the builder is concerned, is that since the
houses are inventory assets, the benefits of Section 337 are
unavailable unless "substantially all" of the houses are
sold to one person in one transaction." It would seem that
even if a buyer could be found, the discount which he
would require would be almost as great as the tax advan-
tage to be gained.9 4
"§ 337(c) (1) (A).
12 Rev. Rul. 58-241, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 179.
§ 337(b).
"The purchaser will determine his price by subtracting from the total
proceeds to be received after the houses are sold and taxes are taken out,
the sales commissions and a large percentage for the risk involved.
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FEDERAL TAX LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
WILLIAm F. MosNim*
In the ordinary course of events, an attorney who re-
ceives an adverse decision from the Court of Appeals based
solely on statutory law - or the lack of it - knows well
that the opinion will state, "If the recognized rule of law
is to be changed, this is a matter for the Legislature, and
not for this Court." Be the disappointed lawyer a crusading
soul - or one with many friends in Annapolis - he may
succeed in having a bill enacted to achieve the statutory
change he feels desirable. However, the reverse of the
picture is most unexpected - that the Courts, after the
Legislature has considered a proposed amendment and
rejected it, will construe existing law to achieve the re-
sult denied by the Legislature. And, once again, the
Supreme Court of the United States has done the unex-
pected.
In its opinion of June 13, 1960, in United States v.
Brosnan,' the Supreme Court has ruled that the fore-
closure of a senior mortgage under State procedure will
completely wipe out junior Federal tax liens, without prior
notice to the Government, without joining the Government
in the case, and without a one-year right of redemption
attaching to the sale.
Perhaps a brief history of the matter would be en-
lightening. As was pointed out in an earlier article pub-
lished in the Maryland Law Review,2 there existed a
considerable problem with respect to establishing clear
title at a foreclosure sale when a Federal tax lien had been
filed against the owner prior to sale. Even though the
defaulted mortgage was senior to the tax lien, the practi-
cally unanimous holding of the cases reported at the time
the prior article was written established the principle that
a tax lien could only be discharged as provided by Federal
statutea This meant by one of three ways: (1) applying
* Of the Baltimore County Bar; LL.B., 1952, University of Maryland
School of Law.
'363 U.S. 237 (1960).
2Mosner, The Nature and Scope of Federal Tam Liens with a Special
Consideration of Their Effect on Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 Md. L. Rev.
1 (1957).
a See Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943) ; United States v.
Kensington Shipyard & Drydock Corp., 169 F. 2d 9 (3rd Cir. 1948) ; Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. United- States, 107 F. 2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939);
Miners Say. Bank of Pittston, Pa. v. United States, 110 F. 'Supp. 563 (Pa.
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to the Secretary of the Treasury for a discharge under
Section 6325, Internal Revenue Code of 1954; (2) bringing
suit to clear title in the Federal Court under the cumber-
some provisions of Section 7424, Internal Revenue Code of
1954; (3) joining the United States as a party in the State
foreclosure case under Title 28, U.S.C.A., Section 2410,
which allows the Government one year from date of sale in
which to redeem.
None of the three methods afforded a really practical
remedy for the mortgagee, as the first two entail a great
loss of time and the third results in a discounted price
being bid at the foreclosure sale, since no buyer will pay
top dollar with the year redemption right attaching to the
property. The moneylender was, therefore, faced with a
serious problem in protecting his investment even though
the property was completely free of liens and the bor-
rowers indebted in no way to the Government at the time
the loan was made. The lender through no fault of his
own was liable to incur financial loss through the facets of
the tax laws which allowed the Government privileges
never afforded to ordinary creditors.
The situation was sorely recognized by those affected,
but every effort by the Bar Associations or Savings and
Loan Leagues to effect remedial legislation in Washington
was met with opposition frcm the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, and the tax laws were not amended to afford relief.
Enter the Supreme Court: The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, in a case involving a tract of land in Pennsyl-
vania, had held that the Government's tax lien - junior
to the mortgage - was effectively extinguished by fore-
closure proceedings wherein the United States was not a
party.4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, ruling
on a California issue, decided that a foreclosure sale
wherein the Government had no notice and was not a
party, was ineffective to wipe out the junior lien as it could
be divested "only with the consent of the United States
and in the manner prescribed by Congress."' The conflict
between Circuits brought the case to the Supreme Court,
and it granted certiorari.6
1953) ; Integrity Trust Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 577 (N.J. 1933);
Oden v. United States, 33 F. 2d 553 (W.D. La. 1929) ; and cases collected
In 174 A.L.R. 1373, 1403 (1948) and 105 A.L.R. 1244 (1936).
'United States v. Brosnan, 264 F. 2d 762 (3rd Cir. 1959).
United States v. ,Bank of America National Trust & Savings Associa-
tion, 265 F. 2d 862 (9th Cir. 1959).
0 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
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The opinion of the majority (Justice Harlan) cut through
the multitude of previously adjudicated Federal cases,
declaring that uniformity throughout the States was a
necessary objective to oil the machinery for the effective
collection of Federal taxes. The Court recognized that dif-
ferent states had different procedures for foreclosure -
some requiring a public sale, some not; some requiring
notice to junior lienors, others not. But, rejecting the
time-honored precept of uniformity, the Court declared,
"We believe that, so far as this Court is concerned, the
need for uniformity in this instance is outweighed by the
severe dislocation to local property relationships which
would result from our disregarding state procedures... ;
and the opinion continued, "We ... believe it desirable to
adopt as federal law state law governing divestiture of
federal tax liens .... "8
Having thus stated its objective, the Supreme Court set
about achieving it by declaring Sections 6325, 7424 and
24109 to be permissive only, and not mandatory directions
as to the exclusive methods for disposing of tax liens, as
had been held by the former decisions.'" (One cannot but
comment that these statutes - if not mandatory - will
quickly become as archaic and unused as those on our
books which authorized public whippings, for no sane
attorney with a title problem will add to his woes by
making the Government a party where the simpler, quicker
and more readily available state procedure will suffice.)
Justice Harlan declared that the legislative history of the
cited sections gave no evidence that Congress believed that
a suit to which the United States was a party was the only
way in which a Federal lien could be extinguished, and he
reasoned that those statutes were only enacted as optional
methods which could be used in addition to existing state
procedures. But it is respectfully submitted that this rea-
soning is difficult to follow. Consider, for instance, cer-
tain excerpts from the legislative debates preceeding en-
actment of these statutes as set out in footnotes to the
majority opinion:
"At the present time, in cases in which the lien
prior in time to that of the United States equals or
exceeds in amount the value of the property, there is
Supra, n. 1, 242.
Id., 241.
'Id., 246-250.10Supra, n. 3.
